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1AC—Terror

Observation 1 is Terror:

Inland Waterways Present a Number of Potential Targets for Terrorist Attack, They are Vulnerable Now and Crucial to American Infrastructure

Heather Nachtmann, Ph.D. and Letitia M. Pohl, Ph.D., "Sustaining Resilient Inland Waterways via Renewable Energy," Mack-Blackwell Rural Transportation Center at the University of Arkansas, July 2011

(http://www.uark.edu/rd_engr/MBTC/MBTC_DHS_1108.pdf)

Inland waterways and the land-based infrastructure adjacent to them, such as power plants, locks,

bridges and pipelines, are clearly included in the maritime domain. These assets may be especially

vulnerable to marine-based attack, natural disaster or accidental events, and their incapacity or destruction could have a debilitating impact on national security, the regional or national economy

and/or public health and safety. Protection of critical infrastructure and planning for recovery in the event of disaster are included in the four objectives of the maritime security program (National Strategy for Maritime Security):

- Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts
- Protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures
- Minimize damage and expedite recovery
- Safeguard the ocean and its resources

Achieving awareness of the total maritime domain is challenging due to the vastness of the oceans, the

great length of shorelines and the size of port areas. The goal of MDA is to identify threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. However, there is also a real possibility that terrorist threats are within our borders or are able to cross our borders undetected. In these cases, the nearly 12,000 miles

of inland waterways can become passageways for terrorists and the associated infrastructure can become vulnerable to attack.

1AC—Terror

While Federal Investment in Waterways Infrastructure is Inevitable, Failures to Keep Up With New Demands is Endangering Security Now

Charles V. Stern, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy at the Congressional Research Service, "Inland Waterways: Recent Proposals and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, April 12th, 2012 (<http://natural-resources-reports.blogspot.com/2012/04/inland-waterways-recent-proposals-and.html>)

Inland waterways are a significant part of the nation's transportation system. Because of the national economic benefits of maritime transport, the federal government has invested in navigation infrastructure for two centuries. As a result, barge shipping has received significant support through federal funding for operational costs, capital expenditures, and major rehabilitation on inland waterways. **Since the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, expenditures for construction and major rehabilitation projects on inland waterways have been cost-shared on a 50/50 basis between the federal government and users through the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF). Operations and maintenance costs for inland waterways typically exceed these construction costs, and are a 100% federal responsibility pursuant to WRDA 1986.**

Future financing for the inland waterway system is uncertain. The IWTF is currently supported by a \$0.20 per gallon tax on barge fuel, but its balance has declined significantly due to a combination of increased appropriations, cost overruns, and decreased revenues in previous years. Without changes to the financing system, IWTF spending is likely to be extremely limited.

Previously the Bush and Obama administrations have recommended replacing the fuel tax with one or more user fees that would increase revenues beyond their current baseline. However, Congress and industry interests have rejected these proposals. In 2010, the Inland Waterways Users Board (IWUB), a federal advisory committee advising the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on inland waterways, endorsed an alternative proposal that is supported by many barge industry interests. The proposal would increase the fuel tax by \$0.06-\$0.08 per gallon, but would also require that the federal government handle the full cost for some projects that are currently costshared. The Obama Administration generally opposes this approach, and has previously submitted multiple proposals to increase trust fund revenues with new user fees, in addition to the fuel tax. Most recently, **the Administration submitted, in its plan to the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, a proposal for new waterway user fees in 2011, and included new revenues from an unspecified new inland waterways fee in its FY2013 budget request. To date, none of these changes have been enacted.**

The user industry (including the barge industry and agricultural groups) argues that **changes are necessary to shore up the trust fund, improve deteriorating inland waterway infrastructure, and distribute costs more equitably among those who benefit from the system** (e.g., more funding by federal taxpayers for dams). They also note that waterways support jobs and are a vital component of the nation's transportation mix. The Obama Administration generally agrees that **major changes are needed to meet infrastructure needs**, but argues against increased costs for the federal government. Some groups also argue that an increased share of waterway costs should be borne by users (i.e., a decreased share for the federal government), and have suggested that operations and maintenance costs (currently a 100% federal cost) should also be a user responsibility.

1AC—Terror

Maritime Terrorism is a Huge Threat to American Waterways Now—Plenty of Opportunities Exist in the Status Quo and are a Valuable Unguarded Target for Terrorists

Cole Maxwell and Tony Blanda, senior instructors in the Marine Training Branch of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, "Terror by sea: the unique challenges of port security," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2005 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_9_74/ai_n15966347/pg_3/?tag=content;col1)

The United States always has defended its borders and natural resources from harm. Unlike threats of the past, however, **maritime terrorism constitutes a multifront conflict both at home and abroad. It recognizes no borders and can originate from organized groups and individuals operating inside or outside the United States.** The fight against maritime terrorism, unlike conventional threats, is a complicated struggle with neither an easy nor a rapid conclusion. **The U.S. maritime jurisdiction represents a daunting challenge: more than 1,000 harbor channels with 25,000 miles of inland intracoastal and coastal waterways that serve 361 ports containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals. Annually, the U.S. Maritime Transportation System manages over 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, more than 134 million ferry passengers, and an estimated 7 million cruise ship travelers.** The dimensions of the extraordinarily difficult task confronting the United States center on an estimated 7,500 foreign ships, manned by 200,000 sailors, entering U.S. ports every year. The more than 6 million intermodal cargo containers that enter annually represent two-thirds of the total value (as opposed to tonnage) of all U.S. maritime trade. (1) **Monitoring the intricate waterways, ports, and interstate connections falls to the marine enforcement officers in the field.** Perhaps, a review of the ports on the [Mississippi River](#) can put the challenge these officers face into proper perspective. **The lower 255 miles of the Mississippi River, from the mouth to Baton Rouge, contain 4 of the top 11 ports in the country.** The Port of South Louisiana, located between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, encompasses a total of 54 miles, while the Port of New Orleans includes 33 miles of the river. The Port of Greater Baton Rouge comprises 85 miles, and the Port of Plaquemines, located south of New Orleans, covers over 80 miles of the Mississippi River. Of particular interest is the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, internationally known as the LOOP, located about 18 [nautical miles](#) south of Grand Isle. **The nation's only offshore deepwater port, it can handle 100,000 barrels of oil an hour, or 2.4 million barrels per day, and services over 30 percent of this country's refineries. Such a valuable resource as the Mississippi River obviously requires protection from the threat of maritime terrorism.**

1AC—Terror

Terrorist Attack on Waterways Transportation Infrastructure Would Instantly Shut Down Global Trade and Collapse the World Economy

Stephen Flynn, National Security Studies, "The Fragile state of container security," testimony before the senate, March 20th, 2003 (<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5730>)

A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, "America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger." We observed that "nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. **If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.**" Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation's immediate attention: "Make trade security a global priority; **the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.**" This is why the topic of today's hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. **U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets.** Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40'x8'x8' size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world's freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about \$1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a \$1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. **But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals.** Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, "seal" it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container's contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America's borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world's freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. "Opportunity" flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting "needle-in-the-haystack" problem for inspectors. "Motive" is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, **should a container be used as a "poor man's missile," the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves "just-in-time" shipments of parts and goods.** Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery device, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive device goes off. A "dirty bomb" is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. **This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life.** In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other key officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, **the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.**

1AC—Terror**Dramatic Decline in the Global Economy Risks WMD Conflict that Ends Human Survival**

Phil Kerpen, policy director for Americans for Prosperity, "From Panic to Depression? The dangers of blaming free trade, low taxes, and flexible labor markets for our current troubles," National Review, October 28th, 2008 (<http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226120/panic-depression/phil-kerpen>)

It's important that we avoid all these policy errors — not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn't end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.

1AC—Terror

Ports and Waterways are the Largest and Most Enduring Threat for WMD and Asymmetrical Attacks on The US

Dr. Scott C. Truver, Executive Advisor, National Security Programs, at Gryphon Technologies LC, specializing in national and homeland security, and naval and maritime strategies, doctrines, programs and operations, "Mines and underwater IEDS in U.S. ports and waterways: context, threats, challenges, and solutions," Naval War College Review, Winter 2008 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_61/ai_n25149608/?tag=content:col1)

A broad spectrum of nontraditional and asymmetric threats challenges U.S. maritime homeland security. (1) **The smuggling of drugs, arms, and people; vesselborne improvised explosive devices, like that used by terrorists against the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole in October 2002; proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive weapons of mass destruction and disruption;** piracy and organized crime; overexploitation of marine resources and the destruction of marine habitats; environmental attacks and trade disruption; political and religious extremism; mass migration flows; global health threats (e.g., the spread of infectious diseases like SARS and avian flu)—**all these and more pose far-reaching dangers for American security interests at home and abroad. Under the cloak of legal activity, groups that would do us harm can enter the U.S. homeland anywhere along more than ninety-five thousand miles of coastlines and through some 360 ports from Maine to Guam.** **"The challenge is enduring,"** Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, wrote in his foreword to the Coast Guard's 2007 [maritime security](#) strategy. (2) "The threats of the Cold War are gone, and we again find ourselves operating in an environment where piracy, illegal migration, drug smuggling, terrorism, arms proliferation and environmental crimes are carried out by anonymous, loosely affiliated perpetrators."

1AC—Terror**Terrorist Use of WMD Risks Globocide—Failure to Defend Causes Extinction**

Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, "The 'Suicide' Bomber: Is It a Psychiatric Phenomenon?" PSYCHIATRIC BULLETIN v. 26, 2002 (<http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285>)

Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life (Hoge & Rose, 2001). Such potential global destruction, or globocide as one might call it, supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of 'suicide' bombers, the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the 'suicide' bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life, including their own.

1AC—Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government Should Substantially Increase its Investment in Transportation Infrastructure By Implementing and Fully Funding Mandatory Tracking Systems for All Vessels, Integrated Communication Technologies for All Ports and Training of Maritime Security Personnel.

1AC—Solvency

Observation 2: Solvency**Federal Investment in Maritime Infrastructure is Crucial to Economic Efficiency and Security on Waterways**

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

Ensuring Economic Competitiveness. Moving people, goods, and services by sea and waterway is extremely cost-effective. In addition, waterborne traffic, while not without environmental consequences, produces much less air pollution than does moving goods by truck. A significant expansion of domestic maritime traffic for the transportation of goods and people could give the United States a key economic competitive advantage in the 21st century. Smaller craft could play a critical role in this economic expansion. The key challenge to exploiting this potential advantage will be public and private investment in maritime infrastructure. Currently, the nation as a whole does a poor job of investing in maritime infrastructure. Federal and state laws do not provide adequate incentives and in some cases discourage investment. In regard to security, this provides a dual challenge to policymakers. On the one hand, further excessive regulation and restrictions in the name of enhancing security will only further discourage investment. On the other hand, as the nation increasingly exploits its ability to move by sea, maritime infrastructure will become even more critical to the economy, and concerns over its security will become even more pressing.

1AC—Solvency

Lack of Tracking Technology in Inland Waterways is the Crucial Gap in Coast Guard Enforcement to Prevent WMD Terror

General Accounting Office, "Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed," March 2009 (<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf>)

U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than \$700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats--including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others--in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard :

(1) has vessel tracking systems in place,

(2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and

(3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems.

To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials.

At sea or in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, **the Coast Guard is currently relying on a diverse array of vessel tracking systems operated by various entities,** but its attempts to develop systems to track vessels at sea are facing delays. For tracking vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses existing national technical means--classified methods of tracking vessels--and plans to obtain vessel identification and tracking information from two more sources, long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), and commercially provided long-range automatic identification system (AIS). However, one source of this information has just become available and the other has been delayed due to technical and operational difficulties. International LRIT requirements generally came into effect on January 1, 2009.

The Coast Guard estimates that commercially provided long-range AIS will be operational in 2014. **For tracking vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based AIS, and also either operates, or has access to, radar and cameras in some ports. The existing and planned sources of vessel tracking information may allow the Coast Guard to track larger vessels at sea, but systems and other equipment that track smaller and noncommercial vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports may prove ineffective in thwarting an attack without advance knowledge.** The means of tracking vessels at sea--national technical means, LRIT, and commercially provided long-range AIS--are potentially effective, but each has features that could impede its effectiveness. **The systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports--AIS, radar, and video cameras--have more difficulty tracking smaller and noncommercial vessels because they are not required to carry AIS equipment** and because of the technical limitations of radar and cameras. In studies GAO reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders, there was widespread agreement that vessel tracking systems and equipment will be challenged to provide a warning if a small vessel is moving in a threatening manner.

1AC—Solvency

Safety Preparations Deter Terror Attacks in American Waterways—Preparation Removes the Incentive for the Attempt

Dr. Scott C. Truver, Executive Advisor, National Security Programs, at Gryphon Technologies LC, specializing in national and homeland security, and naval and maritime strategies, doctrines, programs and operations, "Mines and underwater IEDS in U.S. ports and waterways: context, threats, challenges, and solutions," Naval War College Review, Winter 2008 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0J1W/is_1_61/ai_n25149608/?tag=content;col1)

"Admiral Loewer's comments are right on the mark," Rear Admiral Richard D. Williams III, USN (Retired), underscores. (43) "The breadth and complexity added to the mine problem in an in-port/near-port home-waters situation, as compared to the blue-water or assault-breaching situation, are significant. Not only are U.S. Navy ship and aircraft MCM assets of limited utility in in-port/ near-port roles, but operationally useful environmental, bottom, and port infrastructure data and prearranged logistical and support procedures for each individual port of major importance will be critical to a timely, successful, and safe response to an in-port mine/UWIED scenario." Admiral Williams notes further, "The most important issue [for] current efforts-- as well as supporting efforts at all levels and across all boundaries that need to proceed with appropriate priority--is to define action responsibilities so that requirements can be clearly determined and articulated and budgets aligned to ensure that the right tools and operational support are acquired and put in place before they are needed." In short, once formal requirements for domestic MCM operations are established, operational concepts and concepts of operations agreed upon, risk assessments conducted, and priorities among and timelines for the various ports articulated, capabilities strengths and gaps identified, and time-phased force deployment data laid out, government and industry programs can be put in place to ensure that strategic, operational, and tactical objectives will be met. "Such a capability would have a deterrent effect." Vice Admiral Hull has underscored. "and could make our adversaries think twice before attempting to mine U.S. waters. Why make the attempt if it will be for naught?"

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable Now**Inland Waterways are in Frighteningly Bad Security Conditions—Ports and Waterways are Both Vulnerable to Attack and Disruption**

The Homeland Security Blog, "The Inland Waterway Invitation To Terrorism," July 27th, 2010

(<http://www.thehomelandsecurityblog.com/2010/07/27/the-inland-waterway-invitation-to-terrorism/>)

Congress is now considering a bill that would give security at American ports a much-needed shot in the arm. The homeland security appropriations bill [now in debate](#) would, if enacted, provide \$350 million for the port security grant program. That's a major jump over last year, increasing spending in that area by \$50 million.

The bill also provides finance support for the Coast Guard, as well as funding for increased security grant programs for means of land transit, like buses and trains.

But here at [The All Hazards Training Center at The University of Findlay](#), it is the maritime component of the bill that caught our attention. Findlay is part of the Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and we provide security training and planning for waterway officials in rural areas. So we watch events in the maritime sector of domestic security.

Many are surprised at the immense traffic of rural inland waterways. The [Port of Huntington-Tri-State](#), our largest inland port, handles nearly 80 million tons of cargo each year but is barely within 3 hours of any city of a half-million people or more. And ports and marine terminals are only the most obvious component of marine commerce. River and seaway locks are also a vital part of the nation's waterway system.

[Infrastructurereportcard.org](#) is a fascinating site created by civil engineers that provides their report card for categories of U.S. infrastructure. The site recently graded inland waterways a frightening D minus, citing the fact that nearly half of all locks are obsolete. Should a lock or a busy river or lake port, like Duluth, MN, or our nearby Port of Toledo, or the Soo Locks, become a victim of a terrorist attack, U.S. transportation could be altered drastically. The reverberation would not only cause major changes to the transportation of goods in the immediate days following the attack, thanks to re-routing, but the reaction of maritime security nationwide could greatly slow traffic at all ports and on all rivers.

This week, [New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg](#) touted the current appropriations bill as crucial to the security of the [Port of Newark](#). Clearly, a huge maritime facility like Newark is a visible and complex target with ongoing security concerns. But like many who address the needs of rural responders and security managers, our Findlay All Hazards staff wonders when terrorism will come to an inland target. It's our hope that the programs that arise from this new appropriation bill will meet the needs of inland and rural ports and terminals, as well as those of the larger ports of the U.S.

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable Now**Terrorist Attacks on Commercial and Passenger Vessels are an Increasing Likelihood**

Cole Maxwell and Tony Blanda, senior instructors in the Marine Training Branch of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, "Terror by sea: the unique challenges of port security," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2005 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_9_74/ai_n15966347/pg_3/?tag=content;col1)

A report on piracy and other criminal attacks at sea highlighted the vulnerability of shipping to terrorist attacks. "Today's pirate is tomorrow's terrorist and one can foresee that a nexus will ultimately develop between terrorist organizations and pirates. Both are acts of violence against innocent people, one done for monetary gains and the other perhaps for a political purpose. Since piracy is largely undertaken for a commercial gain, pirates will not hesitate to carry out a terrorist act if someone pays them enough and they have a reasonable chance of getting away." (2) This nexus cannot be ruled out. After all, if terrorist groups are to sustain their operations, they likely will tend toward mounting suicide attacks on commercial and military vessels for such purposes as--

- * procuring alternative revenue for their main initiatives (i.e., simple piracy);
- * carrying out suicide attacks on unsuspecting ships or ports in the spirit of September 11;
- * smuggling weapons and explosives to their affiliates in other parts of the world, probably by hijacking a ship before renaming and otherwise disguising its identity and providing a new crew and manifest;
- * seeking ransoms and trading hostages for members of their groups detained by authorities; and
- * placing mines aboard innocent-looking tugs and barges, commonly found in the coastal and intracoastal waters and ports of the United States.

As an example, the Strait of Malacca, the world's busiest waterway, provides passage to more than one-third of the global trade. The number of vessels that ply the waters ranges from 50,000 to 330,000 each year. Geographically, the Strait of Malacca is 500 nautical miles in length and extremely narrow, especially along its southern half where it ranges from a mere 20 nautical miles wide to as little as 9 nautical miles at the southern end. A terrorist attack on a steamer could endanger the lives of its crew, threaten the safe passage of other vessels and the lives of their crews, and disrupt maritime traffic along the straits, crippling regional and international trade.

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable Now**Terrorist Threats are Numerous on American Waterways**

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

The definition of "small-boat threat" encompasses a variety of possible weapon-delivery vehicles, tactics, and payloads. Vessels include everything from large craft such as small freighters, large privately owned yachts, fishing trawlers, and commercial tugs to dinghies, jet-skies, and submarines, including mini-submarines like those used by the Japanese in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

An attack could involve suicide bombers, as in the case of the attack on the USS Cole, or vessels on autopilot or remotely controlled. Improvised explosive devices could be delivered or emplaced by boats or swimmers (assisted or unassisted by breathing devices). This could involve placing a "parasite" on the hull of a craft or deploying tethered (anchored to the sea bottom) or untethered (floating) mines in a sea lane, waterway, or port traffic area.

Besides conventional explosives, the bombers could detonate nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological devices. Attacks could occur while the targeted ship is docked at shore, approaching a port, sailing in international waters, or in U.S. or Canadian coastal waterways. In addition to ships, attacks could target port facilities; commercial infrastructure (e.g., an entertainment pier, bridge piling, or pipeline); or public events.

How Small-Boat Attacks Are Carried Out

In many respects, small-boat threats resemble other terrorist plots and have a similar signature. They require recruiting, training and planning, surveillance and intelligence collection, operational security, logistical support, rehearsals, information operations, and execution.

Advantage—Waterways Key to the Economy**The Healthy Operation of Inland Waterways is Crucial to Continuation of the Economy Overall**

Heather Nachtmann, Ph.D. and Letitia M. Pohl, Ph.D., "Sustaining Resilient Inland Waterways via Renewable Energy," Mack-Blackwell Rural Transportation Center at the University of Arkansas, July 2011

(http://www.uark.edu/rd_engr/MBTC/MBTC_DHS_1108.pdf)

The inland waterway system is vital to both domestic and foreign trade by carrying nearly one-sixth of the volume of cargo moved between U.S. cities, and connecting ocean shipping to major inland ports. Inland and intracoastal waterways directly serve 38 states. In 2007, total domestic waterborne commerce (inland, coastal and Great Lakes) amounted to over 1.1 billion tons, with a value of over \$380 billion. Cargo shipped on inland waterways alone totaled over 622 million tons, with primary commodities being coal, petroleum and petroleum products, farm products, raw materials and chemicals (USACE, 2009).

Inland waterway transportation offers a safe, economical and energy-efficient alternative to highway and rail freight movement, causes relatively little congestion, produces little air/noise pollution and creates minimal land use and negative social impact. Barges are well-suited to moving heavy or bulk commodities such as petroleum, coal and grain. A typical barge can carry as much coal or grain as 15 rail cars or 58 truck trailers. Figure 3 shows that a typical 15-barge tow carrying 22,500 tons is the equivalent of 216 railcars (2.25 unit trains) and 1,050 trucks (USACE, 2008). The USACE estimates that it would take an additional 6 million rail cars or 24 million trucks to transport the amount of cargo currently carried on inland waterways each year (USACE, 2009).

Advantage—Waterways Terrorism Kills the Economy**Inland Waterways are Key to Economic Functionality—Terrorist Attack Destroys It**

Heather Nachtmann, Ph.D. and Letitia M. Pohl, Ph.D., “Sustaining Resilient Inland Waterways via Renewable Energy,” Mack-Blackwell Rural Transportation Center at the University of Arkansas, July 2011
(http://www.uark.edu/rd_engr/MBTC/MBTC_DHS_1108.pdf)

The Mississippi River and its tributaries have been described as a lifeline to the U.S. economy. Inland waterways as a transportation mode contribute significantly to the U.S. economy, as measured by the value of the domestic and export cargo transported on barges, and by the tens of thousands of jobs associated with river transport and inland ports. The rivers are also critical sources of water for agricultural irrigation, industrial applications, and hydropower. Major metropolitan areas, such as Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Memphis and New Orleans, as well as thousands of smaller communities, were located to take advantage of commercial and recreational opportunities offered by the rivers. Critical infrastructure along inland waterways includes nuclear power plants, military installations, major rail and highway bridges and locks and dams.

As an important component of the nation's transportation system, inland waterways are vulnerable to disruptions due to failures of aging infrastructure, flooding, accidents, hazardous cargo spills and natural disasters (e.g., earthquake in New Madrid Seismic Zone). The waterways are also potential means for launching terrorist attacks on waterside infrastructure and population centers. The resilience of inland waterways is the ability of the system to respond or recover from potential threats due to either natural or manmade causes.

Advantage—Waterways Terrorism Kills the Economy**The Mississippi is a Huge Target—Terrorism on the Big Muddy Would Crush the Economy**

Dr. Deirdre McGowan, executive director of Inland Rivers Ports and Terminals, Inc, "IRPT's Deirdre McGowan reminds that "little, broke ports" on inland waterways have security needs, too," OffNews, November 30th, 2004

(<http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=296>)

McGowan: Inland river people perceive their ports to be the most vulnerable, the most at risk. They point out that, if economic damage is a priority for terrorists, then closing down the Mississippi River would cause tremendous damage. That may be truer for us than for any blue-water port—with the exception of Los Angeles/Long Beach and New York/New Jersey—because we have a monopoly on the north-south barge freight traffic moving up and down the river. Cutting that off would be chaos beyond chaos. And yet, until Round 4 (of the port security grants), the (IRPT members) were only allocated four percent of all the port security money.

I think sometimes al-Qaeda's main goal is to bankrupt us.

Advantage—Economic Collapse Impact (Extinction)**Global Economic Collaspe Would Spur Multiple Conflicts, Terminating in the Ultimate Destruction of All**

Michael Austin and Desmond Lachman, Resident Scholars at the American Enterprise Institute, "The Global Economy Unravels", Forbes, March 6th, 2009 (<http://www.aei.org/article/100187>)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable to WMD Terrorism**Waterway Transit of Hazardous Materials Create WMD Opportunity for Terrorists—They are Not Monitored and Tracked Nearly as Much as Necessary in the Status Quo**

Yangrong Ling et. al, Geosystems Research Institute, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at Mississippi State University and Oakridge National Laboratory, "A Study of Real-Time Identification and Monitoring of Barge-Carried Hazardous Commodities," GEOINFORMATICS, 2009

(<http://cta.ornl.gov/cta/Publications/Reports/A%20Study%20of%20Real%20Time%20Identification%20and%20Monitoring%20of%20Barge%20Carried%20Hazardous%20Commodities.pdf>)

Eight hundred thousand daily shipments of hazardous materials are viewed as a significant threat to U.S. security because they can be easily used by terrorists as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). About 24% of 3.9 billion tons of hazardous commodities is moved by water annually [1]. In response to increased terrorist threats, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Eighth and Ninth Districts, has implemented rules for reporting the movements of Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC) on the inland waterway system [2]. These rules establish Regulated Navigation Areas (RNAs) and the USCG Inland River Vessel Movement Center (IRVMC). Towing vessel operators are required to report to the IRVMC the movement of CDC barges at numerous points such as when entering the RNA, commencing a voyage within the RNA (4 hours prior), dropping off or picking up a CDC barge, transiting specified points in the RNA (certain locks and specified mile points), any significant deviation or delay from the planned itinerary, and exiting the RNA. In addition, fleet area managers must report daily to the IRVMC the inventory of CDC barges within a fleet area and any movement of barges within the fleet area. In 2005, over 40,000 CDC barge movements, more than 100 per day, were reported. [3]. Currently, the reporting system is an honor system and the IRVMC is accepting and "trusting" these cargo reports and position updates [4]. Because many reports are submitted by a manual process, the IRVMC has to keep enough manpower to take reports and update the database twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. The IRVMC usually does not have real-time information on exact location of tows between two specified report points. In practice, towboat operators or fleet area managers may miss reporting or miss some required information in their reports. The analysis also shows inconsistent reporting practices among companies. Some operators provide their location information as frequently as once an hour while others may provide information once a day. The objective of this research is to develop and field test a prototype system that provides more accurate, uniform, and timely data on hazardous movements by barges, especially those certified as Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC), and identify and report barges with potential security threats.

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable to WMD Terrorism**Container Transit Raises the Risk of WMD Terrorism**

Chip Nelson, Car Shipping Expert, "Container Transport and Terrorism," Article Database, December 24th, 2009
(<http://www.articlesbase.com/marketing-articles/container-transport-and-terrorism-1623355.html>)

Container transport specific security measures should be adapted to terrorist threats and their modus operandi. The likely way of such groups to attack or use a certain ship or a container is to hijack a legitimate consignment and then enter a specific country i.e. "Trojan Horse Scenario". But why focus on freight container systems? First and foremost, maritimeshipping containers do business all over the world. Containers are the biggest in number in terms of international trade.

Apart from that, container transport is truly intermodal -making it possible for them to be carried by maritime operators, inland waterway operators and they are even present on the road or railway systems. In essence, container systems are ubiquitous. They can be found just about anywhere -major cities, ports, small side-streets, small villages, etc.

What is not known by the general public is that terrorism has been the target of discussions of the container transport industry and its vulnerability in case of attacks. It is a good thing that security measures implemented by different ports are somehow working. Security measures should be stressed from the very beginning that such terrorist attacks are only potential but governments and ports are advised to examine every container getting inside their country.

Of course, certain security measures implemented by different governments should not be seen by traders as a way to block or slow down the flow of products, whatever they may be. Stringent security measures prevent more losses in terms of cargo theft, or collateral damage due to a terrorist attack. These concerns are being addressed by the different maritime nations and they are working together to stop potential terrorist scenarios from happening by updating security measures and by sharing information to each other.

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable to WMD Terrorism**Waterways Can be Used by Terrorists to Deliver WMD to Inland Targets—Many Targets and Opportunities Require Increased Preparation**

Tampa Bay Online, "Coast Guard will be on waterfront watch for RNC," May 6th, 2012

(<http://www2.tbo.com/news/breaking-news/2012/may/06/memeto2-on-waterfront-watch-for-rnc-ar-400384/>)

All presidential conventions draw protesters and are potential targets for terrorism. But Tampa's waterfront, and the need to keep it safe, separate this year's Republican National Convention from others.

As commander of the U.S. Coast Guard's Sector St. Petersburg, it is Capt. Sheryl Dickinson's job to ensure safety on waters surrounding downtown Tampa during the convention.

"It's a very big responsibility," the St. Petersburg resident said. "But with the great partnerships that we have pre-established, the coordination has been going very, very well. You can't build those partnerships overnight to do an event like this."

According to the Coast Guard's initial waterways security plan, maritime threats include using a small vessel to deliver a weapon of mass destruction; launch a standoff attack weapon; or deliver an armed assault force.

"It's our job to assume the worst and plan for it, and that's exactly what we're doing," Dickinson said. "You can never be over-prepared. We're taking all scenarios and ensuring we're as best prepared as we can be."

Dickinson, a 49-year-old newlywed and mother of two teenagers, has been in charge of the area's Coast Guard since July 2010. She is responsible for maritime operations on the West Coast of Florida — nearly 500 miles of coastline and more than 1,000 miles of inland waterways.

Advantage—Waterways Vulnerable to WMD Terrorism**Bioweapons Would be Easily Deployable on Ports and Waterways—Information and Threat Reduction is Crucial**

Robert Long, Ph.D., "Vulnerability of the United States to a biological warfare attack on coastal seaports and inland river waterways by a well-funded, state-sponsored bioterrorist group using a mobile maritime production facility," Dissertation Abstract, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, 2007 (<http://gradworks.umi.com/32/52/3252079.html>)

The United States (U.S.) response preparedness must be significantly improved in order to successfully counter a BW threat. The National Intelligence Council estimates that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction sometime within the next ten years. This may include biological warfare (BW) as a feasible method to achieve mass casualties. A threat that the U.S. faces is a BW attack on coastal or inland river waterway ports by well-funded, state-sponsored bioterrorist groups. Such groups may use a seafaring ship equipped to produce and deploy BW agents. This seafaring platform for conducting such attacks is referred to as a Mobile Maritime Biological Warfare Production Facility (MMBWPF). U.S. coastal regions are highly vulnerable to a BW attack, which is exasperated by a lack of preparedness protocols or action from primary port security agencies. This renders the research presented in this dissertation critical. For example, the MMBWPF could execute single or multiple uninterrupted BW attacks on U.S. ports, coastal areas, inland river waterways, or populaces. This research argues that it is feasible for a well-funded terrorists group, with sufficient knowledge or support from a state sponsor of terrorism, to obtain, design, equip, develop, and deploy a MMBWPF capability. Finally, the MMBWPF platform is not limited to just a U.S. threat; it could hold any nation's political, economic, and populace hostage. Therefore, a MMBWPF platform could capably attack a broad array of U.S. or global targets to further any political, social, or religious objectives. Planning or government agencies could derive concepts from this research to establish appropriate awareness, prevention, protection, and response architectures. Government planners for port security could use this data to create a holistic BW threat doctrine. Additionally, government planners for the National Response Plan (NRP) could use this data, along with existing data, to streamline NRP protocols. Combining existing and future doctrines and protective architectures could result in an efficient system.

Advantage—Terrorism Impacts (Extinction)**Successful Terrorist Use of WMD Causes Extinction**

Richard Rhodes, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, "Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 14th, 2009 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety>)

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

Advantage—Terrorism Impacts (Extinction)**Super Powered Terrorist Attacks Collapse Civilization, Cause Extinction**

Salon.com, "[Are we doomed yet?](#)" March 31st, 2003

(<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html>)

A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats. Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: "Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before; superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it." Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say, "Civil liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the violence that is on the doorstep." The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -- robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -- but one bot can become many, and quickly get out of control." Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." To cause great harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge, which itself will move through the biosphere, encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, dangerous knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge that has been the foundation of science for 300 years. "Despite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held beliefs."

Advantage—Terrorism Impacts (Extinction)**Escalation of Terrorist Violence Will Exacerbate Security Problems and Doom Civilization**

Yonah Alexander, Professor and Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism, "Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses," DEPAUL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL v. 12, Fall 1999/Spring 2000, p. 79-80.

More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic [67] development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

Advantage—Terrorism Impacts (Escalation)**Nuclear Terrorism Will Escalate to Nuclear War, Destroys Civilization and the Environment**

Dennis Ray Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea, "World on Fire: Two Scenarios of the Destruction of Human Civilization and Possible Extinction of the Human Race," FUTURES, 2009 (ScienceDirect Online)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question "Is Nuclear War Inevitable??" [10].⁴ In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they've figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian "dead hand" system, "where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed," it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States" [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal "Samson option" against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even "anti-Semitic" European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.

Advantage—Terrorism Impacts (Escalation)**Nuclear Terrorism Will Cause a Push For Nuclear Response, Escalates the Conflict Globally**

Patrick Speice, JD at William and Mary, "Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Eliminating the Current Liability Barrier to Bilateral U.S.- Russian Nonproliferation Assistance," William and Mary Law Review, 2006 (Lexis)

Organizations such as the Russian military and Minatom are now operating in circumstances of great stress. Money is in short supply, paychecks are irregular, living conditions unpleasant ... [D]isorder within Russia and the resulting strains within the military could easily cause a lapse or a breakdown in the Russian military's guardianship of nuclear weapons. 38 Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

Solvency—AIS Tracking

AIS Infrastructure Programs Would Allow for Increased Monitoring of All Waterways Vessels, Increases Security and Improves Efficiency

Heather Nachtmann, Ph.D. and Letitia M. Pohl, Ph.D., “Sustaining Resilient Inland Waterways via Renewable Energy,” Mack-Blackwell Rural Transportation Center at the University of Arkansas, July 2011
(http://www.uark.edu/rd_engr/MBTC/MBTC_DHS_1108.pdf)

A major component of MDA is the identification and tracking of marine vessels within or near U.S. territorial waters, using Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). These onboard systems, when activated, automatically transmit information such as the name of the vessel, its position, speed, course and destination. Originally developed to improve navigation safety, AIS allows a vessel's crew to track the movements of other similarly equipped vessels and allows the USCG to actively monitor and communicate with vessels through its Vessel Traffic Service (VTS). This is helpful in preventing vessel collisions, allisions (when a vessel hits a fixed object) and groundings. One of the major limitations of AIS as a security aid is that a vessel must have the system installed and activated in order to be tracked by the USCG and other vessels. AIS is therefore useful in tracking these “compliant” vessels but provides no awareness of vessels that do not have AIS installed or choose to turn it off. The accuracy of the AIS information received is also dependent on the vessel operator's willingness/ability to program accurate information into the system (U.S. House of Representatives, 2009). These limitations are particularly relevant for inland waterways, in that most of the vessels operating on inland waterways are not required to be equipped with AIS.

Under current regulations, vessels not on an international voyage are required to use AIS only in VTS areas (major ports and coastal areas). The only VTS on the inland waterways is in Louisville, KY. Its stated purpose is to help vessel operators deal with high water conditions on the Ohio River, and it is activated only during high water levels, which typically occurs during the spring months (USCG, 2010a). However, a DHS/Coast Guard Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, dated December 16, 2008, would expand AIS applicability to all U.S. navigable waters and expand the types of vessels required to carry AIS. The proposed changes would provide the Coast Guard with the ability to detect and monitor AIS-equipped vessels in areas where little or no shore-side vessel tracking currently exists, such as some inland waterways. This ability would improve navigation safety and heighten overall MDA for inland waterways, by potentially identifying threats to maritime transportation systems and infrastructure. In order to appropriately respond to marine-based threats to infrastructure, however, the information must be disseminated in a timely manner to the agencies responsible for infrastructure protection. Since 2006, the USCG has expanded its AIS monitoring capabilities through a major acquisition program called the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) (GAO, 2009). Figure 16, which shows the AIS coverage before and after the first phase of NAIS, indicates that the increased coverage is primarily along the three seacoasts and the Great Lakes region. Full implementation of NAIS will involve installing receivers, transmitters and other equipment on towers, buildings, bridges and other structures at up to In some U.S. waterways, the USCG also has access to AIS, radar and camera data obtained by other maritime organizations (GAO, 2009). The agency with potentially the most awareness of vessels operating on the inland waterways is the USACE, which operates the locks and dams on the Columbia and Snake, Upper Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, Illinois and Arkansas Rivers. The USACE compiles data such as lock usage, tonnage by commodity category, vessel draft and destination information, etc. The amount of vessel tracking information is considerably less on the Lower Mississippi River, as there are no locks and dams. A current USACE inland navigation initiative includes a coordinated USCG/USACE effort involving the use of USCG AIS data to improve navigation and the potential installation of AIS receivers on locks and dams (Kidby, 2009). Accurate vessel position information would allow the lock operators to schedule vessel arrivals. Vessels equipped with AIS would have the advantage of reduced waiting times at the locks, the ability to regulate their speeds appropriately and conserve fuel, and improved ability to schedule tugs and workers (GAO, 2009). While these initiatives are designed primarily to improve operations, they would also increase MDA.

Solvency—Tracking Systems**Tracking Systems Can Function Automatically Now and Establish the Security of Vessels at All Points During Transit**

Yangrong Ling et. al, Geosystems Research Institute, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at Mississippi State University and Oakridge National Laboratory, "A Study of Real-Time Identification and Monitoring of Barge-Carried Hazardous Commodities," GEOINFORMATICS, 2009

(<http://cta.ornl.gov/cta/Publications/Reports/A%20Study%20of%20Real%20Time%20Identification%20and%20Monitoring%20of%20Barge%20Carried%20Hazardous%20Commodities.pdf>)

Another component of the TRACC is the tracking devices aboard barges. These devices will be attached to multiple barges in the test phase of the system and will report frequently via a cell phone connection. The proposed devices can report up to every 10 minutes if the sun is shining strongly enough to generate the required power. During cloudy periods and at night the devices will report every hour. Some of these reports may still be delayed by the lack of cell signals. The reports will be received by a commercial system and stored for TRACC retrieval. TRACC will use a web services interface to retrieve the data and will then process the reports to estimate the river location from the latitude and longitude, identify any apparent errors and update the trip information database.

Solvency—Tracking Systems Solve WMD Terrorism**Tracking Systems Reduce the Risk of WMD Terrorism on American Waterways**

Yangrong Ling et. al, Geosystems Research Institute, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at Mississippi State University and Oakridge National Laboratory, "A Study of Real-Time Identification and Monitoring of Barge-Carried Hazardous Commodities," GEOINFORMATICS, 2009

(<http://cta.ornl.gov/cta/Publications/Reports/A%20Study%20of%20Real%20Time%20Identification%20and%20Monitoring%20of%20Barge%20Carried%20Hazardous%20Commodities.pdf>)

In response to increased terrorist threats related to hazardous material movements on the U.S. inland waterway system, this research intends to develop a real-time identification and monitoring system, namely TRACC, for tracking barge-carried hazardous commodities. The TRACC system being developed is expected to automatically identify CDC barges and their locations and communicate the collected information to a data server in a real-time fashion. The process can reduce errors caused by manual reports and provide uniform data to facilitate further analysis. The event prediction and anomaly detection modules of the system will analyze the collected real-time data and other information to identify any potential security threats. Analyzed results will be visually displayed in a GIS and communicated to different stakeholders. The TRACC system will benefit homeland security community, first responders, local law enforcement personnel and business by providing timely and accurate barge information to make quick and right decisions in disasters involving CDC movement on the inland waterways.

Solvency—Inter-Port/Waterway Communication**Communication Infrastructure is Poorly Developed and Managed Now—It is Crucial to Detecting and Combatting Terrorist Attacks**

Dr. Deirdre McGowan, executive director of Inland Rivers Ports and Terminals, Inc., “IRPT’s Deirdre McGowan reminds that “little, broke ports” on inland waterways have security needs, too,” OffNews, November 30th, 2004 (<http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=296>)

PSN: How important to the inland ports is the issue of interoperable communications, so that all the relevant stakeholders can talk to each other?

McGowan: Absolutely; this is one of the main complaints that I have heard, that there are problems communicating between the ports, the Coast Guard and the first responders. They have been doing some drills—and I am proud of them for that—and radio interoperability is a problem. There are some technologies that have been evolving and I wanted to do a “proof of concept”—take one port and prove that it works, so that if it does, it spreads around, and if it doesn’t, well we haven’t lost very much.

PSN: In a radio interoperability proof of concept, who all would you seek to involve?

McGowan: Again, port personnel, the Coast Guard and the first responders. The thing is, let’s just take Memphis, which is where I wanted to do a proof of concept (through port security grant funding). Everybody and his uncle has a different kind of radio and a different kind of frequency, and they just cannot talk to each other. Now there is new technology out there that allows everybody to get on the same wavelength using the radios that they have. I thought it was a pretty good solution, and not very expensive. But I was turned down.

I also turned it in, unsuccessfully, for the port of Louisville on Round Two of the port grants, and through in across the river in Indiana, because I felt that if we had an incident; that the incident wouldn’t necessarily be confined by state lines, and that we would need to work together across jurisdictions.

PSN: What else do your members say is needed?

McGowan: A master plan for port recovery. It is perhaps a public relations problem, but we almost had Hurricane Ivan inundate New Orleans and it could have been catastrophic. We could have a terrorist incident in a port. Because of the tremendously good work that MARAD did when Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras and Nicaragua, we have kind of a template to start developing port recovery processes. Even though it is a p.r. nightmare to go out there and say, “We’re doing this because ...” But we have to have something in place to reroute the freight, to handle chemical spills—there are little discreet parts all over the place, but there is no master (plan) for port recovery. Everybody has his own little territory.

PSN: So that is a problem at the back end of the process, but how are the ports facing the current security mandates?

McGowan: My guys were very perplexed by the federal requirements to have facility security plans in place. Part of the requirements is that you had to individualized plans—there seem to be no master plans that you can use, because every port is different. So they didn’t know how to do this. The Coast Guard, bless their hearts, they are so overworked, they couldn’t stop and help the little port of Rosedale, Mississippi, on how to do their facility security plan. And the ports didn’t have money to hire consultants or anything. So what we did was to put on seminars. And I am proud to tell you that we had 51 port owners, operators or whatever show up to learn how to do this, and all but one passed.

Solvency—Training Key to Solve Terrorism**Situational Awareness and Law Enforcement Training are Crucial to Reducing Terrorist Risks in Inland Waterways**

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

Globally, terrorists have shown an increasing interest in using small boats to attack military and commercial shipping and maritime facilities. The tactics and techniques of using commercial or non-commercial vessels (under 500 tons) or swimmers to emplace or deliver improvised explosive devices have proven effective and exportable. Contemporary operational practices by transnational terrorist groups include refining proven attack methods, sharing lessons learned, and encouraging others to adopt effective tactics. Thus, the possibility of such attacks in U.S. waters should not be ignored. The small-boat threat needs to be addressed, but rather than focusing on this particular terrorist tactic, Congress and the Administration should invest in assets that improve the overall security of the maritime domain. The maritime sector is a large and diverse field with unique and daunting threats. Efforts should be expanded to improve U.S. situational awareness and law enforcement response rather than fixating on specific attack scenarios involving small boats or other terrorist threats.

Solvency—Waterway Security is Key to Deterring Terror**Enhancing Security Infrastructure in Ports and Waterways is Key to Deterring Terrorist Attack and Enhancing Domestic Security**

Cole Maxwell and Tony Blanda, senior instructors in the Marine Training Branch of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, "Terror by sea: the unique challenges of port security," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2005 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_9_74/ai_n15966347/pg_3/?tag=content;col1)

Before the tragic events of September 11, marine enforcement officers received specialized training to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration and to protect America's natural resources and environment. Today, however, because of the threat of maritime terrorism, the need for advanced, specialized, and tactical training of these officers has become far more critical.

As the tip of the spear, the [U.S. Coast Guard](#) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are tasked with the protection of America's ports. One of the Coast Guard's principal missions involves safeguarding U.S. ports and waterways, whereas the primary mission of CBP is to inspect cargoes and cargo containers entering U.S. ports. (3) To meet the unprecedented challenges facing them, the Coast Guard and the CBP have allocated additional workers to their respective port- and cargo-[security](#) missions and have initiated several programs designed to tighten security not only of port areas but also of merchant ships, the cargoes they carry, and their crews.

The United States has taken the common-sense approach of detecting and deterring potential threats long before they escalate into clear and present dangers. In the maritime arena, this requires "identifying and intercepting threats well before they reach U.S. shores." (4) This strategy supports national-level objectives while recognizing the uniqueness of the maritime environment, including the difficulty associated with the shared use of oceans and waterways.

Denying the use and exploitation of the [maritime domain](#) by terrorists as a means to attack U.S. territory, population, and critical infrastructure requires increased maritime domain awareness (MDA) and enhanced security operations. Currently, the U.S. maritime domain is protected via intelligence information and layered, multiagency security operations nationwide, including the strengthening of the security posture and reduction of vulnerability of American ports.

AT: Security Programs in Place Now**Status Quo Programs are Ineffective, Uncoordinated and Cannot be Utilized Quickly**

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

Some ports have established operational coordination or information sharing centers, such as Operation Seahawk in Charleston, South Carolina. Typically, these centers do not focus on the small-boat threat, although some coordinate reports of suspicious activity or investigations that might uncover such a threat.

While there have also been some efforts to increase and coordinate police, county sheriff, state game and wildlife, and U.S. Coast Guard waterborne patrolling, these programs are modest. In some cases, volunteer groups such as state maritime defense forces have been used to supplement waterborne patrolling.

Development of the national maritime security strategy and the Maritime Operations Threat Response Plan has improved maritime security coordination overall, but it does not address the small-boat threat specifically.

There have been some marginal efforts to coordinate research and development of technologies and techniques and tactics among the Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Laboratories, federally funded research and development centers (such as RAND and the Homeland Security Institute), and other federal and private-sector entities. However, many disparate pilot projects, experiments, and ongoing initiatives are poorly coordinated and lack a clear plan to operationalize the research results.

AT: Terrorism Would Be Insignificant**The Psychological Impact Matters More than the Actual Disruption—Even a Small Scale Terrorist Attack on the Water Would Panic Americans**

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

The Psychological Impact. Research data make a compelling case that "man-made malicious" events create more fear, apprehension, and uncertainty than natural disasters or accidents. Almost every week, the U.S. experiences maritime incidents that are equivalent to a small-scale terrorist attack in terms of endangering life and property. These range from boating episodes involving individuals to commercial industrial accidents that put hundreds of lives and millions of dollars of infrastructure at risk.

The United States has also experienced a number of large-scale maritime disruptions, which have affected thousands to tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in damage. These include everything from the Texas City (1947) and San Francisco (1944) disasters, which involved large commercial ships carrying extremely hazardous materials, to Hurricane Katrina, which crippled the ports of New Orleans and Mobile. A terrorist attack of similar scale would certainly have a significantly greater impact on the public, particularly because many Americans have only a minimal appreciation of what occurs in the maritime domain. Anxiety is always greater when individuals are less familiar with the situation.

The impact of a terrorist attack might be reflected in many different behaviors and attitudes, from undermining the confidence of Americans in their government to panic buying because of the fear of economic disruption. The scale and duration of psychological damage could vary significantly, depending on the nature of the incident and the character of the response.

AT: Terror Attacks Will Fail**Even a Failed Attack Would Cause Retribution and Escalation to Broader Conflict**

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, political analyst for the Al-Ahram, 8/26/04 <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>, Boxer

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

AT: Terrorists Wouldn't Use WMD**Terrorists Would Determine Nuclear Attacks to Be Cost Effective—They Wouldn't Hesitate to Kill as Many as Possible**

Peter D. Zimmerman, Professor, Science and Security, Department of War Studies King's College London and Jeffrey G. Lewis, executive director, Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "The Bomb in the Backyard," FOREIGN POLICY, November/December 2006

(http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/10/10/the_bomb_in_the_backyard?page=full)

Would terrorists build a nuclear device? Presumably, some terrorist organizations want to kill as many people as possible at the lowest cost. Like any organization, sophisticated terrorist outfits are concerned with "cost effectiveness." It is a gruesome business, but very similar attacks may result in widely different casualties depending on the target. For example, the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003 killed a relatively small number of people compared to the 2002 Bali bombings, despite the use of relatively similar devices. But, if one considers the bulk of terrorist attacks, the relationship of cost to casualties follows a simple curve, with the cost per casualty increasing as the size of the terror attack increases—from the relatively inexpensive Madrid bombing (which cost less than \$10,000, or around \$50 per murder) to the September 11 attacks (which cost \$400,000–\$500,000, or about \$170 per murder). Some might claim that thinking about terrorist attacks in terms of cost-versus-casualty ratios fails to capture the essentially political ends of a terrorist group. Cost data from previous attacks suggest that al Qaeda is sometimes willing to pay a significant premium to attack high-profile, heavily protected targets that may produce fewer casualties, but have greater political implications, such as a U.S. embassy or Naval vessel. For example, the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen may have cost \$10,000, but with 17 casualties, it added up to a pricey \$590 per murder. Yet terrorists do not have to pay a premium for a nuclear attack; on a per murder basis, nuclear weapons are both cheap and can be used against highprofile targets. And a nuclear attack induces great fear. Its specter has hung over the world since the United States dropped Little Boy on Hiroshima. To put it in strictly commercial terms, terrorists would likely find a nuclear attack cost effective. The simple appeal of nuclear terrorism can be illustrated with a hypothetical situation. A failed nuclear detonation, one that produced only a few tens of tons in yield, could kill 10,000 people in just a few hours if the device exploded in a crowded financial center. Not only would 10,000 persons represent the upward limit of a conventional terrorist attack, but that figure would also exceed the combined casualties in all of al Qaeda's attacks over the entire history of the organization. And that's a "worst-case" scenario for the terrorists. A "successful" nuclear detonation would kill 10 times as many people. If terrorists could construct a successful device that killed 100,000 people for a cost of \$10 million dollars—about \$100 per murder—it would be a bargain, considering that most of al Qaeda's attacks have been mounted in the \$100 to \$300 per murder range. A nuclear terrorist attack that cost \$5 million would result in a cost per murder comparable to the Madrid bombings. So, just how difficult an enterprise would this be? What would a terrorist group have to do to build a bomb that would kill 100,000 people for less than \$10 million?

AT: States**The Coast Guard is the Best Strategy to Respond to Terror Threats, They are Only Accessed by the Aff**

Defense Media Network, "Strategy Organized: The Coast Guard and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review," March 7th, 2011 (<http://www.defensemmedianetwork.com/stories/strategy-organized/>)

Through its Maritime Security Operations, Defense Operations, and Maritime Prevention programs, the Coast Guard is a key element of DHS's Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security QHSR mission. In the development and enforcement of safety and security standards and plans, the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and key resources in ports and on waterways are hardened. With a joint intelligence capability and as a ready force on patrol supporting maritime domain awareness, the Coast Guard is vigilant and ready to deter or disrupt terrorist actions.

From the inland waterways and ports to the littoral and high seas, the Coast Guard's leadership as the primary federal maritime law enforcement agency directly supports Securing and Managing Our Borders and Enforcing Immigration Laws in the maritime domain. The Maritime Law Enforcement program leverages Coast Guard authorities to uphold sovereignty, protect marine resources, and enforce anti-smuggling, drug, and migrant laws and certain other international agreements.

By maintaining a readiness posture and establishing a presence in ports, waterways, and on the high seas, the Coast Guard is the nation's premier first responder on the water. The Coast Guard's Maritime Response program Ensures Resilience to Disasters. Through risk assessment, plan development, training, exercises, and daily operations, the Coast Guard continuously improves capabilities in emergency management. The Coast Guard ensures national and key international maritime communities are resilient and prepared, and stands ready to respond to and aid in the recovery from man-made incidents or natural disasters. There is no better demonstration of this capability than the humanitarian response and restoration of port services to facilitate the movement of goods in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Haiti, and the Coast Guard's response efforts in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. During such disasters, and during daily operations across all missions, the Coast Guard leads the development of local, state, interagency, and international partnerships in both the public and private sectors.

The Coast Guard uniquely possesses both civil and military authorities on the water. With a fully integrated approach to national and homeland security set forth in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Coast Guard is a leader in the interagency coordination of maritime activities at home and abroad through its Defense Operations program.

Although competing demands exist between the need for security and the requirement for expediency in commerce and civil liberty, the Coast Guard provides this balance with its MTS Management program. By maintaining navigational aids and disseminating information, breaking ice, and enforcing safety standards, the Coast Guard assures safe and secure flow of people and goods in the nation's maritime regions. The Coast Guard will continue to mature this balance by enhancing the security and resilience of national and global maritime trade and travel systems.

The Coast Guard is an agile and versatile service with a broad range of authorities and unique capabilities. The Coast Guard's core competencies span the safety-security-defense continuum. From regulating and enforcing marine safety laws, to implementing maritime mobility measures essential to commerce, to supporting DoD in defending the nation and deterring conflict in the maritime environment, the Coast Guard is a leader in ensuring safety, security, and resiliency within the maritime domain.

AT: States**Federal Programs are Crucial to Solve—They Have the Interoperable Training Facilities Now**

Cole Maxwell and Tony Blanda, senior instructors in the Marine Training Branch of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, "Terror by sea: the unique challenges of port security," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2005 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_9_74/ai_n15966347/pg_3/?tag=content;col1)

In the post-September 11 world, the threat of terrorist attacks reaches into every segment of American life, whether on land, sea, or in the air. Protecting this country's ports and waterways constitutes a daunting challenge due to the sheer magnitude of the task.

Recognizing the scope of such an undertaking, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has created a new training program for marine law enforcement officers who must safeguard U.S. maritime interests. Providing these dedicated men and women with the best techniques and tactics for dealing with maritime terrorists will ensure that this country remains strong and committed to countering every threat, even if it is borne on the waves.

AT: States

Only Federal Programs Exist Now to Train Security Personnel—They are the Only Opportunity to Coordinate With Crucial Defense Operations

Cole Maxwell and Tony Blanda, senior instructors in the Marine Training Branch of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, "Terror by sea: the unique challenges of port security," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2005 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_9_74/ai_n15966347/pg_3/?tag=content;col1)

U.S. policies direct agencies in the maritime community to deter, detect, and defend against traditional and asymmetric attacks. Every federal, state, and local [marine enforcement](#) officer should have training that addresses the current trends in worldwide maritime terrorism. However, the agencies needing maritime enforcement training have limited qualified educational facilities that, in turn, have few vessels, specialized equipment, and vehicles with which to conduct training. With this in mind, on April 6, 2004, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Driver and Marine Division convened a Curriculum Review Conference of the Advanced Marine Law Enforcement Training Program. Protecting over 90,000 miles of U.S. coastline has become an increasingly difficult task. Therefore, the conference proposed a new curriculum to address the contemporary tactical skills required in the marine enforcement specialty. In addition, the participants recommended changing the program name to the Antiterrorism/Port Security Boat Operations Training Program. Five days in length, the program trains marine [law enforcement officers](#), security personnel, executive protection agents, supervisors of marine units, and others in the knowledge and skills needed to deal with contemporary threats in the maritime environment. The target audience for the revised program includes federal officers and agents with marine enforcement duties or supervisory responsibilities of marine enforcement units; state and local officers who support or work closely with federal agencies involved in marine enforcement; and U.S. Department of Defense personnel involved in harbor security, marine counterterrorism, and other marine tactical operations.

AT: States**Ports and Waterways are More Connected to Federal Anti-Terror Efforts than State and Local Agencies**

Willard Price, professor of operations and engineering management at the University of the Pacific, "Reducing the Risk of Terror Events at Seaports," Review of Policy Research, May 1st, 2004 (EBSCO)

Seaport security in the past has focused primarily on access through the port by those seeking to enter the country to improve their political or economic condition, to engage in illicit smuggling activities, or to steal goods for disposal in the marketplace. Less frequently witnessed were such individuals passing themselves, materials, or weapons through waterfront avenues as instruments of terror. Terror is now the most feared, if not likely, event at a seaport and the reason substantial attention and resources are being devoted to ensuring security by all levels of governments, port authorities, private operators and shippers, and intermodal freight forwarders/customs brokers.

While ports are mostly local, in some cases state or bi-state public authorities exist, and their relationship with the federal government is immense, even deeper than their connection to their own states. Seaports do not receive a direct subsidy from the federal government, while many do receive general support by their states. Yet ports receive extensive indirect support from the US government via the coast guard, the Corps of Engineers, the Commerce Department, the Maritime Administration, and the Department of Transportation. Additional security services are delivered by the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), though these and other federal services may be viewed as disruptive to cargo movement, aggravating port efficiency.

AT: States**The Counterplan Doesn't Solve and The Net Benefit is Non-Unique—Not Only are Waterways Looking for Federal Leadership Now, Increased Federal Management is Inevitable**

Willard Price, professor of operations and engineering management at the University of the Pacific, "Reducing the Risk of Terror Events at Seaports," Review of Policy Research, May 1st, 2004 (EBSCO)

Yet all of these public and private agencies are looking to the federal government for grants to as they strive to satisfy the security objectives set by federal legislation and homeland security mandates. As with so many other public policies, the US government requires state or local action without paying for these mandates. Regardless, the national government is not always legally required to pay and they are certainly resisting the political clamor for immediate large funding. The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) has taken a "no un-funded mandate" position and estimates the cost of seaport security: 85 US member ports could need as much as \$2.6 billion, but that does not cover the cost for private ports and terminals. Regional security plans in the law also may require additional money to secure inland waterways in the vicinity of ports. (Edmonson, 2003)

It is obvious federal agencies will eventually provide larger contributions to the ports, albeit maybe not the entire cost. Again there are benefits to local public and private entities, should they not provide some investment to be recovered from those who ship cargo. Airline passengers are directly paying a portion of the new TSA costs at airports, so why should seaports be exempted?

AT: States

Only the Navy Can Fight Marine Terrorism Effectively

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

Law enforcement at all levels also has very limited capacity to disable small craft or swimmers and ineffective response times in meeting unanticipated threats. Methods of incapacitation mostly involve the use of potentially lethal force. Rules for the employment of lethal force are not consistent across government agencies. In addition, methods for disabling small boats using non-lethal technologies are neither widely available nor particularly effective.

Only the U.S. Navy has any notable capacity to detect and clear mines and improvised explosive devices at sea or in waterways. No dedicated domestic assets can address waterborne mines. The U.S. navy has conducted some research and has developed some capability to detect and interdict swimmers, but this capacity is not widely available for U.S. ports or waterways. Any application of additional technologies or capabilities for interdiction and response has significant cost and technical implications.

AT: States

Centralized Data and Knowledge is Crucial to Establish Port Security and Training—Only Federal Authority Can Ensure State and Local Cooperation

Dr. Scott C. Truver, Executive Advisor, National Security Programs, at Gryphon Technologies LC, specializing in national and homeland security, and naval and maritime strategies, doctrines, programs and operations, "Mines and underwater IEDS in U.S. ports and waterways: context, threats, challenges, and solutions," Naval War College Review, Winter 2008 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_61/ai_n25149608/?tag=content;col1)

However any focused domestic mine survey program is undertaken, a consensus is growing that there must be a central database of [American](#) port infrastructure and environmental survey data that can "set data standards, conduct critical analysis to produce tactical decision aid products, and hold this information centrally," according to Commander Robert Witzleb, Deputy Director, Oceanography Operations for Mine Warfare. (38) "Such a centralized data repository exists in practice at the Naval Oceanographic Office, which has the largest oceanographic holdings in the world, but is nonetheless very weak in US waters. For that reason," he continued, "Navy METOC [the Meteorology and Oceanography Command] has prepared a draft technical instruction, Mine Warfare Survey in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense, that explicitly details how we would collect environmental data to support domestic MCM operations."

"We need that information now, not when the act takes place," Tony Fuller, who supports concept development and experimentation for Navy mine warfare sea trial initiatives, noted in a March 2007 e-mail exchange. "There is a significant amount of gap analysis that will need to be conducted, probably followed by substantial programmatic issue work. In simplest deck-plate terms, the direction as to what has to be brought to bear in a port to begin MCM in how much time, culminating with what has to be accomplished, in how much time, to make the call that all, or part, of a port is 'open' is needed."

Finally, there are operational and tactical issues that need to be addressed. The [Coast Guard](#) and Navy in the spring of 2007 were developing a domestic MCM concept of operations within the MOTR framework. These concepts and associated response plans, which will involve relevant state and local actors, must be specific to and in place for selected ports and waterways well in advance of the first "flaming datum." The two services are building upon recent war games and exercises—for example, LEAD SHIELD III in 2005, which brought together a broad spectrum of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations to deal with terrorist mines in the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach—and upon the Navy's real-world experiences of clearing the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq, in 2003. Coast Guard, Navy, and other participants must equip for, train to, and exercise the plans; analyze and share the results of the exercises and war games; refine concepts of operations and "TTPs" (tactics, techniques, and procedures); incorporate new technologies and systems—and then plan and train and exercise again, and then again.

Neg—No Terror Risk Now**Bin Laden's Assassination Has Destroyed Al Qaeda—No Risk of Attacks**

Fareed Zakaria, International Scholar, "Al Qaeda is Over," CNN , May 2nd, 2011

(<http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/02/al-qaeda-is-dead/?hpt=Sbin>)

But the truth is this is a huge, devastating blow to al Qaeda, which had already been crippled by the Arab Spring. It is not an exaggeration to say that this is the end of al Qaeda in any meaningful sense of the word. Al Qaeda is not an organization that commands massive resources. It doesn't have a big army. It doesn't have vast reservoirs of funds that it can direct easily across the world. Al Qaeda was an idea and an ideology, symbolized by an extremely charismatic figure in Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden was this Saudi prince-like figure who had gone into the mountains of Afghanistan forsaking the riches of a multibillion-dollar fortune, fought against the Soviets, demonstrated personal bravery and then crafted a seductive message about Islam and Islamic extremism as a path to destroy the corrupt regimes of the Middle East. History teaches us that the loss of the charismatic leader - of the symbol - is extraordinarily damaging for the organization. It is very difficult to keep such an organization together, particularly in the absence of great power backers. In the case of al Qaeda, this is a virtual organization held together by its message and the inspiration it provided. A large part of that inspiration was bin Laden. Ayman Zawahiri may have been the brains behind the outfit, but he did not excite people. When people volunteered for jihad, they were volunteering to be bin Laden's foot soldiers, not Ayman Zawahiri's or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's. The loss of bin Laden's personality is hugely important because it was so much part of al Qaeda's appeal. In addition, we must remember that the death of bin Laden is not occurring in a vacuum. The Arab Awakening has already crippled the basic rationale of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda existed because bin Laden argued that the regimes of the Arab world were dictatorial and oppressive. He argued that the United States was supporting those regimes and, as a result, Muslims had to engage in terrorism against the United States and those regimes. He claimed that the only way to achieve change was through violence, terrorism and Islamic extremism. In the past few months, we have seen democratic, peaceful, non-Islamic revolutions transform Egypt and Tunisia. We are seeing these forces changing almost every government in the Arab world. Al Qaeda is not in the picture. So when you combine the Arab Spring with bin Laden's death, you have a very powerful one-two punch to al Qaeda. Certainly, there are groups of terrorists around the world, some of which now call themselves al Qaeda. These groups are loosely affiliated in some sense. But gangs of bad guys have always been around. With the death of bin Laden, the central organizing ideology that presented an existential seduction to the Muslim world and an existential threat to the Western world is damaged beyond repair. We're left with free-lance terrorists who will, of course, be able to inflict some harm. But the Somali pirates are able to inflict harm on civilians, and that doesn't turn them into an existential threat to the Western world. That existential threat is gone.

Neg—No Terror Risk Now**Terrorism Causes Virtually No Damage—There is Little Risk**

John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University, **OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM**, 2009, p. 13.

For all the attention it evokes, terrorism, in reasonable context, actually causes rather little damage, and the likelihood that any individual will become a victim in most places is microscopic. Those adept at hyperbole like to proclaim that we live in "the age of terror." However, the number of people worldwide who die as a result of international terrorism is generally a few hundred a year, tiny compared to the numbers who die in most civil wars or from automobile accidents. In fact, until 2001 far fewer Americans were killed in any grouping of years by all forms of international terrorism than were killed by lightning. And except for 2001, virtually none of these terrorist deaths occurred within the United States itself. Indeed, outside of 2001, fewer people have been killed in America by international terrorism than have drowned in toilets or have died from bee stings. Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count, however, the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s (which is when the State Department began its accounting) is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts. In almost all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the hands of international terrorists is not much more than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States.

Neg—No Impact, Terrorism Insignificant**Actual Attacks Would be Insignificant—Current Safety Measures Solve Now**

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," Heritage Foundation, June 11th, 2007 (<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/06/small-boats-big-worries-thwarting-terrorist-attacks-from-the-sea>)

Physical Destruction. A small-boat attack is unlikely to cause a large loss of life or property unless it involves a weapon of mass destruction or highly hazardous material that causes a large-scale fire or explosion. Even a large-scale disaster involving thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage is unlikely to have long-term negative consequences for the U.S. economy.

In many respects, the response required in the event of a small-boat attack would resemble the response to a fire, explosion, or industrial accident. Thus, many of the current safety measures, equipment, drills, and training required for maritime safety would be applicable to reducing the loss of life and property in the event of a small-boat attack. Likewise, any measures to improve overall safety, firefighting assets, all-hazards disaster response capabilities, search and rescue, other emergency services, and salvage and recovery would contribute to reducing damage in the event of a successful attack.

Neg—Terrorism Doesn't Hurt the Economy**Empirically, the Economy Quickly Recovers After Terrorist Attacks**

Associated Press, "Terrorism Hurts Markets, But How Much?" , September 4th, 2006 (Lexis)

How much does terrorism affect stock prices? To find the answer, economists have parsed market reaction to events dating back to the 1915 sinking of the Lusitania, academics have studied how attacks on McDonald's restaurants have affected the company's stock price and researchers in Israel have chronicled what 13 years of suicide bombings did to stocks there. Their unsurprising general conclusion is that terror attacks hurt stock prices but some of the details are unexpected. For instance, after Sept. 11, 2001, the stocks in the Standard & Poor's 500 rebounded to their pre-attack prices faster than every other major world index except Japan's Nikkei, according to research by Andrew H. Chen of Southern Methodist University and Thomas F. Siems of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. What none of the research has answered is the degree to which the fear of another terrorist attack on the United States has been factored into stock prices. David Sowerby, chief market analyst, Loomis, Sayles & Co., estimates that the threat of terrorism represents a 5 percent "tether" on stocks. How did he get that number? The overhang is "more than zero, less than 10. Five seems reasonable. If I said 4, I'd be fine-tuning it too much," he said. The price-to-earnings ratio on the S&P 500 is around 17. A traditional model pegs the price-to-earnings ratio, one of the most popular methods of gauging a stock's value, to Treasury bond yields. Under that formula, the price-to-earnings ratio should be closer to 20, said David Wyss, chief economist for Standard & Poor's. What's holding prices back? "Is it terrorist attacks, distrust of earnings, expectations of a slowdown?" he said. "I don't know." Similarly, "people keep saying there's a war premium in the price of oil," said Robert Streed, portfolio manager of Northern Trust Select Equity Fund in Chicago. "People keep throwing out numbers, but I can't see any objective way they come up with those numbers." Those who say some threat of a future attack is already baked into stock prices hasten to add that another attack in the United States would still send prices lower. "We would likely see a drop in stock prices of significant proportion, but investors seem to believe there would be a subsequent recovery," said Lynn Reaser, chief economist at the investment strategies group of Bank of America.

Neg—Spending Links**All Forms of Port and Waterways Security are Extremely Expensive**

Dr. Scott C. Truver, Executive Advisor, National Security Programs, at Gryphon Technologies LC, specializing in national and homeland security, and naval and maritime strategies, doctrines, programs and operations, "Mines and underwater IEDS in U.S. ports and waterways: context, threats, challenges, and solutions," Naval War College Review, Winter 2008 (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_61/ai_n25149608/?tag=content:col1)

Some have suggested that the Navy revisit its port-breakout model for key commercial and military ports to identify critical routes and other areas needing attention and to conduct channel-conditioning operations that would in essence wipe clean selected areas to facilitate subsequent change detection. (By 2006, the [Royal Navy](#) had already embarked on such an effort in several British ports.) Others have proposed resurrecting the ill-fated COOP--Craft of Opportunity--program of the mid-1990s and having Navy Reserve units conduct periodic surveying and sonar mapping of bottoms. Still others have recommended that the maritime transportation industry and port authorities take the lead for local areas. Or the survey and mapping responsibilities could be outsourced to commercial contractors. In short, in mid-2007 there was no coherent plan, staffing, or program--except perhaps for references to the USCG's sector/COTP responsibilities for port maritime security plans, area security assessments, and area maritime transportation plans, in addition to the efforts of the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee--to address this threat and port geography and environmental data requirements. Even then, Captain Davilli's concerns loom large.

Collecting such MCM data for even a handful of ports and keeping it up to date will not be inexpensive. In May 2007, for example, NOAA estimated that it could conduct a survey program that would support draft Navy-Coast Guard operational concepts--twenty ports per year and relooking every three years--at a cost of approximately \$14 million per year. This figure is well below an "educated guess" that Los Angeles/Long Beach alone would require about \$10 million annually, raised during a December 2006 technology war game. (36) In any case, compared to the \$60 billion economic impact if major ports were closed for a couple of weeks or more, several million dollars each year seems to be an insurance premium that the nation could and should afford.

Neg—States Solve

Local Leadership is Preferable in Port and Waterway Operations—The Affirmative Risks Inter-Agency Battles and Decreased Efficiency

Willard Price, professor of operations and engineering management at the University of the Pacific, “Reducing the Risk of Terror Events at Seaports,” Review of Policy Research, May 1st, 2004 (EBSCO)

Port security is clearly a national issue, but conducted at the local level by public authorities and many private companies. The federal government has extensive operations at ports securing vessels, passengers, and cargo. At the same time, the national government has embarked on a new department to achieve homeland security. The previous efforts of the HSA have now evolved into the DHS. The DHS has four principal directorates: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology: Mass Destruction and Information Analysis, and Infrastructure Protection. Ports and trade are served for the most part by the Border and Transportation Security (BTS), with its two major bureaus (Saccomano, *The Devils in the Details*, 2003):

1. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP): Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), border patrol, and customs. The BCBP focuses on the movement of goods and people across borders. 2. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE): Enforcement

functions, federal protection services, and transportation security/coast guard. The BICE focuses on enforcing immigration and customs laws and inspecting marine vessels.

The interesting distinction is that the two agencies most involved with seaport operations, customs and coast guard, are in different bureaus of the BTS. No doubt some “turf battles” over authority will surface between the BCBP and the BICE, a tradition that was to be avoided with a new department. It is essential that the federal government speak with a single voice in the field. An active lead agency for providing security strategy and guidance on the law, regulations, and operational standards for ports and private shippers is not yet visible. It should not be necessary for ports to wait for instructions from Washington, DC. Rather a single field commander in each port region providing rapid and unambiguous policy positions is desirable.